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ABSTRACT

This paper presents arguments for the notion that as a field of study, educational administration is necessarily undergoing change and development within the context of the culture in which it is being studied. For this reason the paper concludes that the field cannot justifiably be viewed as producing conclusive end products (rules for effective administrative procedure) that can be transferred to other organizational and cultural settings. The paper begins with a brief, fictional dialogue that clarifies the different perspectives of those seeking the growth of educational administration in their own developing nations and those visiting these nations as experts from more developed countries. The problematic aspects of the application of the concept of "development" to the field of educational administration are introduced next, in the context of historical and cultural trends. Reflection on these factors leads to the conclusion that challenges to the West's prevailing theory regarding educational administration must be welcomed and all issues must be debated vigorously. The paper concludes by examining the debate's ramifications in terms of the roles in educational administration of reflection, ethics, and morality on one hand, and of action, authority, and the use of power on the other. (PGD)

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THE STUDY OF EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION: A DEVELOPMENTAL POINT OF VIEW[1]

by

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"To put away one's original thoughts in order to take up a book is the sin against the Holy Ghost."

Schopenhauer

This is an essay about educational administration and "development." The immediate impetus for writing it came from an invitation to participate in a seminar on educational administration in developing areas, with emphasis on the Commonwealth Caribbean. Thus the familiar meaning of the term "development" which I first brought to this essay: the process of transferring patterns of thought, motivation and action from one area or country to another.

As I began to write the essay, however, I recalled that as ideas move from one place to another they become different, sometimes subtly, sometimes profoundly: they are transformed, not merely transferred. And it struck me that these transformations are similar to those which have taken place over time in the study of educational administration. Toynbee once characterized civilization as a "movement ... and not a condition, a voyage and not a harbor."[2] So it is with the development of thought and fields of study. The essence of understandings with improved practice, not the acquisition of a deterministic set of characteristics or a mere shift from one state to another. This became the broader and more important meaning of the term "development on which this essay is built.

Development: A Conversation

Imagine, if you will, the following conversation about international development and relations between persons from developed and developing countries.

A Travelling Academic Consultant: I've really enjoyed my stay in your country. Thank you very much.

A Host Country Civil Servant: We have appreciated your visit. Thank you for your help.

Academic: Really, in quiet moments I sometimes think that you worked with me only because it was a condition of Canadian aid.

Host: We talked about that ritual before, didn't we?

Academic: Yes. In any case, I have learned more than I have taught ...

Academic: Do you know that your country really has a lot of potential. I must say that, when I came here I did not know what to expect. But I was pleasantly surprised. So many people have advanced training. There are even graduates from Oxford and Cambridge!

Host: Yes.

Academic: But still, you seem to have a long way to go. This could be a really exciting place if people weren't so "laid back" and, quite frankly, inefficient.

Host: Our last Canadian consultant said the same thing.

Academic: Are we right?

Host: Maybe you just see the world in the same way! ...

Academic: The thing that struck me most about your country is its schizophrenia. On the job, people are extremely formal. It is always Mr. or Mrs. this and Dr. that. Off the job, those same people are very relaxed and spontaneous with each other. It is as if they are different people.

Host: I don't like the word schizophrenia, but I have seen what you are describing.

Academic: Have you? Then why don't you do something about it? This separation is dysfunctional. People would like their work a lot more and the government would operate much more effectively if the gap were not so great.

Host: Perhaps.

Academic: Not perhaps! Everything I know confirms how important this is.

Host: You North American academics are too close to organizations and their managers. Ever since Roethlisberger and Dixon found out that organizations could be more productive with the support of informal staff groups. social relations among workers have been manipulated to some organizational purpose. You are interested in studies of motivation and psychology because of a concern for productivity, not out of an interest in improving people's lives.

Academic: Now that is going too far, don't you think?

Host: No. Your organizations, your bureaucracies, have become your lives. Not here. Here our lives are really lived apart from organizations.

Academic: Oh?

Host: But there is more. Government bureaucracy has always had a negative image for us. This is because the only government organizations were foreign bureaucracies which symbolized our status--first as slaves or displaced workers and then as colonials. Even though we now direct those bureaucracies, we continue to think of them in the same way. We dislike them. That is why we are so formal--we refuse to get too involved with them, we separate ourselves from them, we make them unreal, and we mock them. What you call schizophrenia serves us very well. It keeps us sane.

Academic: I hear what you are saying. But I am not sure I really understand.

Host: Good. Now you and I are making progress ....

Host: But I sometimes wish I could say the same thing about my country. When we achieved our political independence twenty years ago our hopes were high and we believed we could achieve them. Now it is much harder to be so confident.

Academic: How would you like me to help?

Host: Let us find our own way before I answer that question.

Perspective

The words, and the images and relationships behind the words, in this conversation are central to the question, "Are theory and research in educational administration transferable to developing countries?" This is because the conversation illustrates: the historical and cultural location of the key assumptions in any view of organizations and their management; the problematic nature of those assumptions when they are considered for use in some other location; and, consequently, the problematic nature of the relationships of people from different places, including relationships between people from "developed" and "less developed" or "developing" countries. All of this is familiar to anyone who has experienced the pleasures, frustrations and intellectual growth that can accompany working with people from other places.

What is less familiar and will be the substance of this paper is that this conversation is also a metaphor for the development of theory and research in educational administration. This is because it shows theory and research in our field in a developmental perspective, illustrating that more complex, differentiated and valid conceptions of educational administration can only be accomplished though a critical analysis of our current theories and assumptions and that dissonance or uncertainty is an important stimulus to this analysis.[3] The conversation also implies an emerging sense of relativism which is necessary for the further development of our field.

At the same time, I will argue that this sense of relativism, however useful and important it has been, is not sufficient to the continuing development of

educational administration as a field of study or practice. Simple or naive relativism is not workable, either intellectually or emotionally, for any person who is engaged with practical affairs. Life, thought and work must be focussed by some commitments, that is values or interests with which we identify and which are chosen within an awareness of relativism.[4] Seen in this light, the further development of educational administration requires both a critical analysis of current theory and research and an examination of the commitments to which they are attached. These will be normative and ethical undertakings as well as social-scientific ones. The result, I hope, will be theory of a different kind: partly empirical and partly moral; partly sympathetic and partly critical; and always concerned with the accomplishment, through deliberation, practice and the just use of power, of the best traditions of the culture in which it is located.

Educational Administration as a Field of Study: A Brief History

Seen up close, as when one reads texts, journals, dissertations or abstracts, educational administration seems too diffuse or inchoate to be called properly a field of study, too full of opinion and speculation to be termed a discipline. There appears to be no body of knowledge to define it, no common methodology to shape it. Yet from another and more distant vantage point, which offers a somewhat overgeneralized but still useful perspective, the many different studies and approaches in the field seem held together by near unanimity on a small number of common assumptions. Four of these are most important.

One, educational organizations are, potentially at least, socially useful. They have become instruments of public policy and social progress, however these are defined at various times and in different places.

Two, the study of education administration is best located within the traditions of the social sciences. These traditions were shaped by the Renaissance belief in our capacity to control our environments through observation and reason and by nineteenth century liberalism's views of rational government. Comte was perhaps the first to envision the sociologist as the priest of a new rational order, but he was by no means the last. Lasswell put the case for the social sciences, and for scientifically organized knowledge as a primary basis for social action, this way:

> In common with any branch of social and political science, psychology bears an instrumental relationship to morals and politics .... The spectacle of frustrated moral intention is familiar in the ordinary experiences of ... life .... Moral intentions call for more than self-knowledge. They must be implemented by reliable knowledge of the attitudes of other people through time and of the factors that affect them ....

> If our moral intention is to realize a democratic society, we need a science of democracy to implement the goal .... Our aim ... is nothing less than to give hands and feet to morality, to discern with ever increasing accuracy the causes and controls of human destructiveness. Moral values are acquired from the experience of human nature in contact with culture; they are derived from a specialized branch of culture, metaphysics and theology; they are implemented by other specialized branches of culture, psychological, social and political science, and psychological, social and political practice.[5]

Three, following the social sciences in the United States and under the early influence of positivists such as Feigl,[6] the study of educational administration is properly guided by an interest in: formal, verifiable hypotheses derived from theory; and a view of theory which is detached from personal commitment, objectified, highly rationalized, and restricted in scope.

Taken together and mutually reinforcing each other, these first three assumptions lead to a fourth: a particular view of educational organizations and of how social and educational progress were to be achieved. Goal-directedness, efficiency, effectiveness, functional behavior and directive leadership are primary virtues, to be given theoretical support and empirical bases.

These four assumptions, and not some particular theoretical formulation or body of knowledge, have been the theory movement in educational administration, its raison d'etre and inspiration.

The theory movement served professors and researchers of educational administration very well from its beginnings in the late 1950's until the early 1970's. Most universities established graduate programs in the area; an academic ethos influenced the field; journals were created; research grew in volume and quality; researchers linked themselves to government agencies which agreed to fund their work. Educational research and development centers were created across North America. A great deal was accomplished, or so it seemed at the time.

For a variety of reasons, this rate of accomplishment could not be sustained. By the early 1970's enthusiasm for research and development in education had begun to wane: in Canada, for example, persistent rumors began to circulate about the future of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education and the Alberta Human Resources Research Council was disbanded in 1972. In the "parent" disciplines, especially sociology, fundamental criticisms of the disciplines' methods and conclusions began to surface; critics such as Mills[7] and Gouldner,[8] who wrote but were largely ignored in the 1950's and 1960's were given a long-postponed hearing and were soon joined by others.

It was in this context that Greenfield[9] presented his important critique of methodology and the values inherent in the theory movement in educational administration. Drawing upon work in the phenomenological tradition, Greenfield argued that by virtue of their preferences in theory and methods, schclars in educational administration had produced theories which represented a superficial and distorted conception of educational organizations and a very faulty picture of the individual within them. Quite predictably, the reaction against Greenfield was immediate, intense and acrimonious.

The self-criticism in which Greenfield played a central role was not to be halted. While most theorists were unwilling to concede Greenfield's most important points, a number of others asserted that the theory movement in educational administration had been unproductive: Halpin[10] wrote about "the fumbled torch" and lamented the failure of the theory movement to live up to its early promise; Iannacone,[11] about "the smoggy view from the valley" and the difficulties of interdisciplinary, theory-guided research in educational administration; and Erickson,[12] about "how to get the idiot off the freeway" and the reluctance of administrative theorists in education to attend to problems of organizing teaching and learning in schools.

The main consequence of this self-criticism to date has been a sense of pluralism and relativism about the methods of research in educational administration, often reflected in assertions about the value of multiple methods and different perspectives. Although a positivist image of theory and research in educational administration is still strong (and, perhaps, growing more so because of recent interest in effective schools), phenomenological and critical views have gained credibility, especially in parts of England, Australia and Canada. While the debate has subsided somewhat, the dualisms and issues which can divide theorists are now widely familiar: objective versus subjective views of social reality; hypotheses derived from theory versus propositions obtained through reflection on experience, quantitative versus qualitative approaches to methodology.[13]

Commitment and Its Consequences for Theoretical Work in Educational Administration

But, the debate has been limited and the resulting pluralism has been confined largely to technique. Other assumptions of the theory movement--particularly those about formal theory as the primary basis of administrative action, and administractive action as goal-directed efficiency--have been left in the background of the debate. The central position of this paper is that, if the debate is ultimately to become fruitful, it must be extended to include simultaneously critical attention to these other assumptions. This is because concern for epistemology and technique is illusory when it neglects attention to purposes. And if social critics such as Berger[14] or Hummel[15] are correct, exclusive concern with technique is also dangerous, because to keep it in the

foreground and relegate other concerns to a rather blurred and unexamined background is ultimately to distort the whole picture by allowing: means to replace ends as ultimate norms; cases to replace persons; effectiveness to replace ethics; functions to replace action; and command to replace dialogue.[16] It is to distort our images of ourselves.

It is clear, then, that I value moral concern as well as thoughtfulness: I cannot maintain for long a posture of detachment when confronted by the moral urgencies of a situation. For example, while I can be reflective about their origins and what might be done about them, I simply cannot be neutral on matters of inequality, alienation or oppression. To be fully human requires action as well as reflection, compassion as much as reason, determination and skill as much as understanding.

And so I bring us to questions of reflection and action, of ethics and authority, of morality and the just use of power. We also come to our images of ourselves--the values with which we choose to identify and which we choose to pursue. And we confront what development (whether of theory or of persons) really means: enlarging our perspectives, recognizing the cross-currents of life, being committed while tentative, affirming our values while respecting those of others, believing in our basic values but yet being willing to learn, valuing intelligence and action, and seeing development as a journey which all of us retrace over and over--I hope--more wisely each time.[17]

Moving morality and the just use of power along with epistemology to the foreground of our thinking about administrative action in education--in effect creating an approach to our work which is empirical as well as moral and concerned with the just use of power to accomplish the best traditions in our cultures--will reshape the nature of theoretical work in educational administration. Our work will be given meaning and direction by broadened ideas about the nature of intellectual activity in educational administration and an enlarged conception of our subject matter.

Ethics and Reflection: Broadening Intellectual Activity in Educational Administration

Although we all know it well in everyday life, when we struggle with making sense of the contradictions between our desires and our actual accomplishments, too little is formally known in the social sciences about the approach to intellectual activity in educational administration for which I am arguing in this essay. Yet there are exemplars--Dewey,[18] Mills,[19] Myrdal,[20] Weber,[21] Berger,[22] and others. All share a humane vision of the social sciences, a commitment to social justice, a willingness to expose their core values to analysis and debate, a high level of regard for those whose lives they reflect upon and become engaged with, and a fine sense of intellectual craftmanship. It is these qualities which we should seek to emulate.

As we move toward a way of thinking about educational administration that is more useful to practical, ethical purposes, the nature of our intellectual activity is broadened. We begin to move away from a posture which is largely theoretical and restricted in scope to another which is more broadly reflective and more encompassing of human thought and experience. Of the features which accompany such a broader perspective, I believe six to be the most important.

One is the recognition, in both practical and intellectual affairs, that knowledge (including formal epistemology), evaluation (morality) and action (especially, I will argue later, the just use of power) are inseparable. Lewis' statement on this matter is the clearest:

> Knowledge, action and evaluation are essentially connected. The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action: knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation. For a being which did not assign comparative values, deliberate action would be pointless; and for one which did not know, it would be impossible.[23]

Two, to the extent that it can be considered separately, the task of reflection or anlaysis is to inquire into these values and their realization in practice: what they mean, whether we are really motivated by them, what we are doing in relation to them, whether we could do better, whether our action on them is unbalanced or have unanticipated consequences, and so on. The purpose of analysis achieved through methods which are sympathetic and critical is to clarify human purposes and to seek alternative possibilities for accomplishing them more wisely and completely.

Three, that analysis is best conducted within an atmosphere based on equality of regard, with emphasis on reason and persuasion, not coercion or the presumption that some persons' postions are more valid or less distorted than those of others. No group of persons, including social scientists, can be assumed to have greater capacity for detaching themselves from their interests or desires than others.[24]

Four is the appreciation of the historical, cultural and institutional locations of our work. I mean here an attitude of critical self-awareness. Theory and research can only be understood through an examination of the intellectual history that has shaped the theoretical and research inquiry. Researchers also have personal and institutional histories. Most of us at this seminar are university professors--this fact determines very much what we seek to accomplish and what we are able to do. We cannot detach ourselves from the intermeshing of history and culture with our lives, the institutions in which we work and our place (including roles and status) within them.

Five is the awareness that the purpose of our work is our continuing development, not simply the accumulation of theory or knowledge. Here development means the ongoing acquisition of: more complex, differentiated and valid conceptions of ourselves and our environments and of extended conceptions of beauty, goodness and truth; and commitment, motivation and skill to act on the basis of these conceptions. Without the conjunction signified by the italicized "and," development simply will not be complete. We know from Piaget's work on human development that it is the constant interplay of thought and action, of experience and its reconstruction in thought to guide future experience, which leads to development.[25] This is true of theory as well--unless it is brought to application and refined or reconstructed through practice, it will remain arid or, as more commonly put, "academic".

Six, the direction of our work is by the best values of the culture in which we are located. While it is obvious that there will be reasonable disagreement about the content and meaning of these values, I do not believe that the matter is, or for that matter can be, completely relative. For example, I believe that rational persuasion is superior to coercion, that personal freedom should be extended and that each individual's claim to freedom is equal to that of every other individual. In a sense, because I am not able to demonstrate logically the ultimate correctness of these views, I cannot argue that these represent more than articles of personal faith. And yet I know that they are more than this--I wish that I could use the German, "Ich verstehe," here because it would communicate simultaneously that I understand them intellectually and I believe them to be right. They are part of the liberal intellectual tradition of western society and shared by many people, though far from all. Perhaps they are best characterized as ideas which, while not absolute, are worth living by.

In a sense these points, aimed at enlarging the perspectives of those who "always know the score but never the game being played,"[26] are underlaid by a conception of intellectual work in educational administration as an ethically-informed reflection upon and engagement with practical affairs, sensitive to problems of power in the theory-practice relationship. In this conception I take Schutz's "true for all practical purposes"[27] rather than "truth" or "isomorphism" as the most important criterion for assessing our work. Indeed, in the social sciences I regard truth, if by it we mean knowing for certainty and objectivity the attributes and operation of a social world, to be an impossibility. Our "knowledge" of the social world is too nested in culture, our models too contradictory, our data too open to alternative interpretations, to believe otherwise. Bateson is persuasive:

> Science probes, it does not prove .... All experience is subjective .... Our brains make the images we think we "perceive" .... The division of the perceived universe into parts and whole is convenient and may be necessary, but no necessity determines how it shall be done .... Logic is a poor model of cause and effect .... Language stresses only one side of any interaction.[28]

"True for all practical purposes" does not seem a neat criterion by which to judge intellectual activity. This is because it does not provide the phantom of an external standard for measurement and justification. Rather, it calls for people to answer questions of validity both for themselves and together with others, in the contexts of their experience and purposes. But we do have James' criterion:

> Test every concept by the question, "What sensible difference to anybody will its truth make?" and you are in the best possible position for understanding what it means for discussing its importance .... Any idea that helps us to deal, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in frustrations, that fits, in fact, and adapts our life to the reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement.[29]

It is important that this not be misunderstood as a vulgar pragmatism, concerned only with the question, "Will it work?" Of course it will--we know from experience that almost any form of social organization and any style of individual behavior will have its adherents, even its advocates. Rather, in the spirit of Arendt's view that "the trouble with modern theories of behaviorism is not that they are wrong but that they could become true ...",[30] the real questions are "For what purposes is this idea useful to whom?" "How does it help in our efforts to shape a 'good' society?"

Development, Culture and Political Ethics: Elements for an Enlarged Theory of Educational Administration

Human activity in organizations is manifestly complicated. Part of the difficulty that we theorists experience in dealing with it conceptually can be attributed to this inherent complexity. But, our problems as theorists can be traced also to our failure to conceptualize administration or life in organizations in a way that is useful to practical, ethical purposes.

Development and Engagement The most obvious features of organizations is that there are people in them. No metaphor from mechanics, cybernetics, economics or biology does sufficient justice to this important reality, nor does any intellectually convenient dualism: in organizations people work and play, love and hate, waste time and behave productively, pursue their self-interest and contribute to the common good, follow plans and act spontaneously. And, while organizations structure environments with rules and regulations, as must be the case, people bring with them their own knowledge which may be most important to their work--especially the social abilities to express themselves maturely and intelligently, be attentive, concentrate, volunteer, comply, engage in constructive self-directed activity, initiate work interactions, accept responsibility, carry through and complete tasks, exercise self-control, show creativity, assert their interests, show sensitivity to the needs of others,

and enjoy a sense of accomplishment about purposes achieved. The threads that are these actions and relationships are woven together in organizations in such a way as to form both widely shared meanings and a multiplicity of individual, status and group realities.

At any time in the history of an organization, these meanings and realities come to individuals as ideas which they inherit from their predecessors in the organization, as directives which they receive from their superiors, and as conditions which they constantly create for themselves. All of these--history and culture, external authority and self-direction--are part of experience and the human condition in organizations. Seen in this way, organizational life is both a re-enactment of history and culture and an original performance on the part of its current members, an inheritance and a personal accomplishment. This, of course, is a way of bringing Giddens' point about sociology into theory for educational administration: "Men produce society but they do so as historically located actors, and not under conditions of their own choosing."[31]

It is in this mixture of tension between the pre-given and the emergent, the appreciation of history and the anticipation of a future, that there occurs the development of persons and the organizations in which they work. Indeed, development (as the acquisition of more complex, valid and differentiated understandings of self and environment and of the motiviation and skill to act on the basis of those understandings)[32] will not occur without the generation and reduction of dissonance. Tension sets the stage for development, marks its trajectory and shapes its outcome.

Development does not mean the sudden emergence of some idea or thing which was previously unexpected. Whild occasionally dramatic, for the most part the processes of development are gradual, often so gradual that change is discernible only in retrospect. We reconstruct our vision and understanding of organizations (as, for example, Weber did for us all) only infrequently; much more time is spent transferring the concept to new cases or completing additional examples, the key ingredients in both cases being repetition and elaboration.

While development seems to be a natural and ongoing process when seen in retrospect, at the time it takes place it is not experienced as an inevitability. It is shaped by individuals who avoid or become engaged in the development of themselves or the organizations in which they work. The processes of avoidance in organizations are well known. They include[33] temporizing (putting possibilities off for a period of time), escape (exploiting excuses such as relativism to avoid commitment or responsibility), alienation (the abandonment of interest and involvement), and retreat(avoiding ambiguity and political action, in the spirit of Fromm's Escape from Freedom).[34]

Also well known are the processes through which we engage in the development of ourselves and our organizations. These are familiar as the "projects" described by the existentialists, the change movements described by critical theorists, and the enthusiasms portrayed by theorists of organizational development. They involve a sense of purposefulness, personal identification, power and concerted action. Central to them are what Berlew calls "value-related opportunities"[35] in organizations: opportunities to experiment, to do something which is good, to do something especially well, to do something which is unique, and so on. And they seem to require the leadership that MacGregor-Burns describes as transforming,[36] that is leadership which is democratic and which lifts followers into "their better selves". More succinctly, development requires engagement not avoidance. And engagement, in turn, requires a perception of a valued purpose and a process that is empowering of individuals and groups: these are matters of culture and political ethics.

Culture. Ideas about development and engagement reflect a fundamental cultural shift in how we have come to understand ourselves. For most of Western history we have assumed that behavior, events and regularities in the social world were products of forces beyond individual control--we assumed that we were made by history, or shaped by natural laws and invisible hands. The more recent developmental perspective asserts that as individuals we can be participants in the making of our history.

This perspective also distinguishes ours from non-occidental cultures. Other cultures have different views of human nature, learning and change, of individual agency and efficacy, and/or the relative importance of individuality and group belongingness as sources of human meaning and identification. Berger's discussion of the erosion of honor, a group concept central to most traditional societies, and the emergence of individual rights as a dominant social ideal in our urban and bureaucratic culture, is most instructive here.[37]

This bias in our culture, which is historically recent, has profound implications for how we view and act on the world. It enables us to entertain the possibility that we might reconstruct our worlds, makes us responsible for the values which we choose to pursue, and holds us accountable for the consequences of our choices. Persons who would make history must also assume its burdens and accept responsibility for failures to realize their best values.

Conventional administrative theory deals with these ideas of value and choice in a very restricted and culturally-centered way. In this theory values become goals, and choices are about targets, functions and timelines--the imagery is of a bureaucratic, strategic calculus by those in positions of power. I take issue with such views only when they are used exclusively or predominantly. I prefer to think of purposefulness in a more comprehensive sense, to include: the seemingly unaware activity associated with routine processes; the strategic

calculus of persons in positions of influence; the variety of purposes that are pursued within organizations, not just those which appear functional for them; and the overall movement of persons, organizations and society in the realization of certain values.[38]

Seen comprehensively, most aspects of life and work in organizations are ethically problematic and merit sustained analysis. One can question the purposes of organizations, the distribution of an organization's benefits, or the responsibilities of organizations to alter, rather than merely reflect, existing social and economic realities. Or examine issues about the rights and obligations of clients, employees, managers and employers. Or probe specific problems such as affirmative action, whistle-blowing, deception and the deliberate withholding of information, subversion and disobedience, the theft of intellectual and physical property, and so on. Or critically appraise the dehumanizing aspects of bureaucracy or of "group think" in social settings. Of course, these issues of culture, values and ethics can be approached in a variety of ways. I am drawn to three: the critical analysis of culture, the development of conceptual frameworks for the resolution of moral and ethical issues, and reflective studies of whether and how we are true to the values that we profess as being the best in our culture. Clearly, anything approaching a comprehensive treatment of these matters is an encyclopaedic task, far beyond the scope of any essay. What follows is a brief indication of some of the work required--studies of the culture and normative frameworks of organizations, and the values they act on, not just espouse.

When I speak of <u>culture</u> I mean the symbolic universe within which we function and which we create. In the analysis of our contemporary culture, the most important themes have to do with modernity and our sense of social progress and individual development. These affect our individual consciousness, the way we structure our organizations, and the manner in which we conduct and direct public affairs. Central to what we call modern consciousness are: rationality in the immediate, functional sense; the idea that reality is constituted of clearly separable elements; the view of life itself as an ongoing exercise in problem-solving; the notion of multiple realities which make difficult the creation of an overarching symbolic universe; a view of human affairs oriented toward "progress;" and individuality, the belief which asserts the primacy of individual human rights and freedoms.[39] Many of us share these views by virtue of when and where we live, our race, and our status. The point is that <u>we</u> hold these views, and cannot choose to not have them: they are there inevitably (and usually unexamined) as the silent background which gives shape and form to our thought and work. But many others do not share our <u>Weltanscheuung</u>. I am reminded here of the recent experience in Canada of attempting to enshrine certain aboriginal rights into the Canadian constitution. To this point, the exercise has been extremely difficult and largely fruitless. Part of the difficulty has been political--the problems of obtaining agreements among thirteen governments and numerous representatives of aboriginal peoples have been intractable. But more fundamental have been the cultural differences between aboriginal peoples and our governments. Aboriginal people simply see the world

in different ways, and would act on it differently, enshrining group rather than individual rights, emphasizing the preservation of their cultures rather than individual progress, and working from a wholistic rather than a segmented view of their lives and affairs.

Normative conceptual frameworks are also needed, both to guide the making of moral judgements in administration and the design of organizations and to appraise existing social and organizational conditions. The frameworks would be built upon a platform of such culturally-based ideas as right, wrong, duty, responsibility and desert and would be used in an evaluative and prescriptive fashion to guide action. Examples of this sort of work are infrequent in administration; Vickers,[40] Hodgkinson[41] and Toews[42] are among the few who come to mind. We need such work in educational administration because both education and administration are moral enterprises. Education is a social good, relevant to the advantages that individual and groups acquire in society. It is important to inquire into the distribution of these advantages and whether what we have accomplished contributes to the pursuit of our good society. Administration and the design of organizations are similarly moral, concerned with freedom and the allocation of authority to make decisions in organizations. I have a particular interest in distributive and discretionary justice and believe that benefits and decisions in educational organizations must not favor one party over some others without sound principles or reasons. This clearly raises the question of moral reasoning: "What is the nature of valid moral judgements and by what criteria will they be judged valid?" We come then to conceptions of justice, to our sentiment of humanity and fellow-feeling, to the making of just and unrepressive rules, and to considerations of duties, rights, motives and deserts which make particular judgements or distributions legitimate.

Finally, we require reflective studies which combine empirical investigation with moral concern in inquiries into whether we are accomplishing our most valued purposes. We need to know whether our actions are producing ethically right results--results for all of us, not just for men, members of the upper and middle classes, or white people alone. I do not intend here to explore old distinctions between science and ideology, for I think they are largely unfruitful--intellectual detachment, insofar as it is possible, is not identical with the absence of moral concern or compassion. Indeed, it is when intellectual detachment and moral engagement are taken together that each is the strongest, combining to form the "hard-nose utopianism"[43] which is essential to our future, whether as theorists or as citizens.

Political Ethics and the Just Use of Power. Throughout this essay I have touched, in passing, on the concept of power in what may seem to some readers as several disparate ways: as a central element of our subject matter in education administration; as a problem in the relationship between theorists and practitioners of educational administration; as a part of the process of development, in which the transfer of power in favor of the developing person is

an essential condition of development itself; as an issue in the design of organizations, manifest in the allocation of varying amounts of authority to different roles and positions in organizations; or as an instrument of social change by which we accomplish the best traditions of our culture.

There can be no doubt about power in educational and other organizations: it is present, often tangibly so, in the lives of people, their relationships with each other, and their collective ability to accomplish their purposes. However it is characterized or attributed--as a commodity, a reward, a condition of success, an individual characteristic or an expression of collective will and determination--it is a dominant feature of life and work in all organizations.

While political philosophers have given much attention to the problem of power in organizations and societies, theorists in educational administration have been curiously uncritical about it. Power has been defined, measured and attributed to different bases; but apart from the theorists of organizational development in education who would equalize it, power has not been dealt with as a (or the?) central problematic of organizations. I think this is because theorists take power and the right of administrators to exercise it for granted: in turn, the principal reasons for this may be that theorists identify with administrators in organizations or they may be dependent upon administrators for access to organizations in which to conduct their research.

At the present time in educational administration this uncritical identification of power with administrators is clearest in the research and professional literature on effective schools. This literature portrays instructionally-effective schools as institutions shaped by powerful and determined administrators who transform their schools through qualities such as: singleness and clarity of purpose; assertiveness; being prepared to confront norms of teacher autonomy and if necessary, to sacrifice interpersonal relationships for the sake of student achievement; and political and bureaucratic acumen, focussing on purposes which will be endorsed by their superiors and shaping their relationships to promote their interests. For a variety of reasons, this research has attracted wide academic, professional and public support. Educational administration is now marked by calls for such "strong" leadership and for the redirection or preparation programs and professional practice along these lines.

This research may have some value. Yet I think that something more, or rather better, is needed. There are two reasons for concern. One is that this research is silent about the essential moral foundation of education. The question here is not whether "effective" schools should be based only on these values, but whether these are the right, the "best" values. The second reason is that the imagery which the above view of administration and the use of power in educational organizations evokes persistently, while perhaps benevolent in its concern for student achievement, is limited and ultimately despotic. The

biases that it reflects are fundamentally anti-democratic. It is unflattering to teachers and students, depicting them as persons of low status, limited talent and uncertain commitment, unwilling to pursue academic achievement without determined leadership. It overlooks the reality that self-directing, self-acting and self-respecting persons at all levels are the foundation of democratic organizations and social systems.

To view the relationship between administration and the use of power critically is to raise the problems of freedom and justice in organizations. What are, and should be, the limits on extending freedom to all persons in organizations? By what authority and with what power do we bring certain ideas or practices into effect in organizations and exclude others?

In these matters I find the liberal-developmental view most convincing; it underlies the various comments about power that I have made elsewhere in this essay. In outline, that view suggests that individual freedom should be extended as far as possible, with each individual's claim to freedom being regarded as equal to that of every other individual. Freedom is not merely the chance to act on impulse or the opportunity to choose among given alternatives. It is, "... first of all, the chance to formulate the available choices, to argue over them--and then the opportunity to choose."[44] For this reason, freedom cannot exist without an enlarged role for rational persuasion in organizational affairs. Freedom is also the power to bring these choices into effect. It cannot become a reality without a democratic conception of organizational authority and leadership. All of this means that the actions of authorities ought to be unrepressive, the power of authorities should be restricted and balanced, and the processes through which authority is exercised ought to be grounded in rational persuasion rather than on dominance, whether of tradition, personality or position.

Such a view of the "just organization" is not commonplace in contemporary theoretical work in educational administration. Paradoxically though, the issues which this view raises are part of our everyday lives and practice in educational organizations. For instance, I work in a university in which the faculty are members of an organized labor union. Collective negotiations frequently center on matters related to "management rights," whatever these may be. Individual grievances often have as their substance the principles of natural justice--for example, whether administrators provide employees with the right to be heard or with opportunities to appeal when making decisions about them. Clearly, more work along these and other lines seems to be required if we are to take seriously the problems of freedom and power in organizations. Needless to say, I would encourage others to speculate on these issues.

A Concluding Note

In some ways, I suppose, this essay has grown too long, has been too wide-ranging, and has strayed too far away from its starting point in an hypothetical conversation between an academic from a developed country and a civil servant from a developing country. An yet, as I reread the paper, I think it makes for this seminar the three points that I set out to express.

Educational administration is an area of study in the process of change and development. Changes are much needed, for they may enable us to acquire more complex and differentiated views of educational organizations and of our relationships as theorists to them. I believe (hope might be a more appropriate owrd) that the long-term result will be theory of a very different sort than is now dominant in the field, theory which combines intellectual craftsmanship with moral engagement.

Because our area of study is in the process of change and development, it is best not to see it as a product, readily transferred to other settings. It is not that. And, if I am correct about the cultural bases of our work, it will neve be in any literal sense.

For these reasons, we theorists in the developed world can be of most help to those in the developing world by being ourselves and by actively engaging in our own development. Among other things, this will mean being more imaginative and more determined in our own search for alternative ways of knowing, valuing and doing educational administration.

NOTES

[1]I am indebted to Thomas B. Greenfield, Benjamin R. Levin, Robin Farquhar and John Stapleton for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

[2]Arnold Toynbee, quoted in John Gardner, Self-Renewal (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

[3]This view of development was articulated by Urie Bronfenbrenner, The Ecology of Human Development (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

[4]I take the emphasis on relativism and commitment in development from William G. Perry, "Cognitive and Ethical Growth: the Making of Meaning."

[5]Harold Lasswell, "A Psychologist Looks at Morals and Politics," Ethics (April 1941).

[6]The influence of Feigl and the positivists of the Vienna Circle on the early theory movement in educational administration is not to be underestimated. For a glimpse of this, see Daniel Griffiths, "The Nature and Meaning of Theory," in Griffiths (ed.), The Behavioral Sciences and Educational Administration Chicago: The University of Chicago Press for the National Society for the Study of Education, 1964).

[7]C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (London: Oxford University Press, 1959).

[8]See especially Gouldner's The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York: Basic Books, 1970). Although written in 1970, this book is an extension and a consolidation of many of the points Gouldner had made earlier.

[9]T. Barr Greenfield, "Theory about Organization: A New Perspective and Its Implications for Schools," in M. Hughes (ed.), Administering Education: International Challenge (London: Athlone Press, 1975). The paper was presented at the 1974 International Intervisitation Program.

[10]A.W. Halpin, "Administrative Theory: The Fumbled Torch," in A.M. Kroll (ed.), Issues in American Education (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).

[11]L. Iannacone, "Interdisciplinary Theory-Guided Research: A Smoggy View from the Valley," Teachers College Record, 75 (September 1973).

[12]D.A. Erickson, "An Overdue Paradigm Shift in Educational Administration, or, How Can We Get that Idiot Off the Freeway," in L.V. Cunningham and others (eds.) Educational Administration: The Developing Decades (Berkeley: McCutchan, 1977).

[13]See, for example, my "The Theory Problem in Educational Administration," The Journal of Educational Administration, 16 (October, 1978).

[14]All of Berger's work is worth careful study. In the context of development see especially Pyramids of Sacrifice (New York: Basic Books, 1974), and The Homeless Mind (New York: Vintage Books, 1973).

[15]Ralph P. Hummel, The Bureaucratic Experience (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977).

[16]Ibid.

[17]Perry, op.cit.

[18]A collection of Dewey's work which is useful for educators is Reginald D. Archambault (ed.), John Dewey on Education (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1974).

[19]Mills, op. cit.

[20]Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Research (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969).

[21]Weber is too infrequently remembered as a penetrating critic of bureaucracy. See Max Weber, "Bureaucracy," in G. Roth and C. Wittich (eds.), Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology (New York: Bedminster Press, 1969).

[22]Berger, op. cit.

[23]C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Evaluation (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1946).

[24]Bronfenbrenner, op. cit., goes further, arguing that an interest in development requires a deliberate transfer of power on behalf of the developing person.

[25]All of us have our own preferences in Piaget's work. I most like his The Construction of Reality in the Child (New York: Basic Books, 1954).

[26]Joseph Tussman, quoted in Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry (Scranton, Pennsylvania: Chandler, 1964).

[27]Alfred Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

[28]Gregory Bateson, Mind and Nature (New York: Bantam Books, 1980).

[29]William James, quoted in C. Curtis and F. Greenslet (eds.), The Practical Cogitator (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1962).

[30]Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958).

[31]Anthony Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

[32]Bronfenbrenner, op. cit.

[33]Perry, op. cit.

[34]Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York: Avon Books, 1971).

[35]David Berlew, "Leadership and Organizational Excitement," in Barry Staw (ed.), Psychological Foundations of Organizational Behavior (Santa Monica: Goodyear, 1977).

[36]James MacGregor-Burns, Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978).

[37]Berger, The Homeless Mind, op. cit.

[38]Gibson Winter, Elements for a Social Ethic (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

[39]Berger, ibid.

[40]See, for example, his Making Institutions Work (London: Associated Business Programmes, 1973).

[41]C. Hodgkinson, Towards a Philosophy of Administration (London: Blackwell, 1978).

[42]Otto B. Toews, Discretion and Justice in Educational Administration: Towards a Normative Conceptual Framework, unpublished Ph.D. thesis (University of Manitoba, 1981).

[43]Berger, Pyramids of Sacrifice, op. cit.

[44]Mills, op. cit.